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A Study of Labor Banks in the United States
I. Introduction
purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to trace the evolution,
growth, aims, distinctive features, immediate advantages,
intangible effects and prominent successes and failures of
the labor banking movement in the United States from 1920
up to the present time v/ith the idea of presenting the out
standing facts which authorities have given prominence,
with the aim of weighing the evidence, and evaluating the
facts presented to establish the claim that labor banks as
a social factor were a constructive feature in the develop
ment of the labor movement in the United States.
Nature of the Study
The purpose of this thesis is stated above. This
study is not intended to be a material contribution to
knowledge in this field, but it is an intensive study of
the available literature on the subject from 1920 dowrn to
the present year. Material has been gathered from books,
magazine articles, surveys and reports, with an intention
to present the prominent features of a subject which was
not treated in book form until it had been in existence
nine years. (1929).
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History of the Labor Banking Movement
No lengthy critical analysis of the history of the
development and growth of labor banks, and of their out-
standing successes and failures was brought to the atten-
tion of the public until in 1929, the Industrial Relations
Section of Princeton University brought forth an exhaustive
study of the labor banking movement in the United States.
Previous to that date, practically the only information
which was available to the public were the short discussions
of the subject in magazine articles: occasional newspaper
items: the regular statements of the financial resources
of labor banks as issued by U. S. Department of Labor,
and articles which appeared in publications
,
which were
the organs of labor unions. Hence no impartial and sub-
stantial well-rounded view of the question was open to
the public. The latter was quite apt to receive a dis-
torted view of the subject, which depended very often upon
whatever circumstances were brought to light concerning
labor banks in its district.
It does not seem pertinent to the subject here to
do more than mention the fact that labor did go through
several phases of development, one of which was character-
ized by constant conflict between labor and capital. As
capital used what the sociologists and economists would
with .justice, consider anti-social practices, labor
I
.
3 .
gradually awakened to the belief that the wielding of
financial power by capital alone, was one of the greatest
sources by which the latter was able to force unjust
demands upon the workers. Therefore it is no great
surprise that certain leaders of labor saw in the forma-
tion of labor banks, one way in v-hich they could speak to
capital on equal terms.
"Organized labor in the United States has rarely
been successful in its cooperative and business undertakings.
Except for the traditional insurance and benefit funds,
which are established features of many labor unions here
and abroad, the labor movement before the war ventured
only occasionally, and on a small scale into the fields of
finance and business." 1.
The aspirations set loose the world over, by the
v;ar, took the form in this country of elaborate programs
of industrial democracy, such as the Plumb P}.an, and of
business enterprises ov;ned and managed by various organiza-
tions of labor. Of all the varied proposals considered
during this period, only the labor bank appears to have
caught the imagination of the leaders of organized labor.
The movement as a whole failed to realize the hopes of its
founders
.
The labor bank is distinguished from the ordinary
commercial bank chiefly in that (l) it is owned and con-
trolled by labor; (2) it limits the dividend payable to s
stockholders to ten per cent; (3) it pays a higher rate of
interest on deposits, generally four per cent on savings,
and two per cent on check ing accounts above $500, and
1. dolman, Leo. Quarterly Journal of Economics
XLIV (May 1930), p. 545.
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computes interest from the first day; and (4) it pays to the
depositor, over and. above interest, dividends from its net
earnings
.
The labor bank is chartered in the regular way, under
State or Federal laws, and is subject to the usual strict
examination. Control rests with the labor union, or unions,
and its membership: (a) through possession of the majority
of the voting stock of the bank; and (b) through union
officials and other men in sympathy with labor, who consti-
tute ohe majority of the officers and the board of directors.
The labor union, itself, as an organization, operates the bank,
ass amine, usual financial liability to depositors.
Mr. Leo dolman, a keen student of economic developmei t
says
:
"The facts of labor banking in their most flagrant
and dramatic aspects are best illus trated in the story of
the financial and business undertakings organized by the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers." 1,
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Cooperative Bank
opened in November 1920, and for six years, additional banks,
owned or controlled by the Brotherhood, or by its members, or
by its subsidiary financial companies organized for the purpose,
were started throughout the country. A series of investment
and holding companies were started by the Brotherhood at the
same time, to expedite and simplify the sale of stock of both
its own companies and of others. The Brotherhood did not limit
its activities to banks and financial companies, but as an
1. Wolman, Leo. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
XLIV (May 1950), p. 545.
I
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organization and with its members and clients, and through
the holding and investment companies and nev. corporations,
bought and operated specific enterprises, coal mining pro-
perties, laundries, office buildings, apartment houses, and
undertook the development and settlement of the city of
Venice, Florida.
It will be interesting to trace the inception and to
note the growth of these new financial institutions. The
unions by v/hich the first banks were organized in 191:0- -the
International Association of Machinists, and the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, were among the richest and most in-
fluential of American trade unions. For years, these unions
carried many thousands of dollars in trade union funds on
deposit with capitalist banks, and received interest on these
deposits ranging from 2-g- to 3 per cent. The primary purpose
in establishing their own banks was to secure larger earnings
on those funds. Had this remained the primary purpose, the
labor banking movement would not be far from the point at
which it started.
After the labor banking movement had been in operation
five years, students of the movement were agreed that the
"American labor banking movement going hand in hand as
it did with a labor investment movement, which promises even
more striking results, is the most important economic develop-
ment since the first American trade unions were es tablished. M 1.
Through the trade union banks
,
the American wage earners
contributed directly to the credit resources which were essen-
tial to modern industry. Through the labor investment c. .«
1. Boeckel, Richard. Labor Banks in the United States.
Bulletin of the Pan American Union. LIX (July, 1925),
p. 673
.,
.
,
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companies which sprang up side by side v. ith the labor banks,
the wage earners contributed directly to the supplies of
capital which were necessary to the creation of new indus-
trial enterprises, and to the expansion of existing enter-
prises. By 1S25, six labor investment companies, organized
by important unions were in successful operation in the United
States with an aggregate capitalization of $25 , 000 , 000 . The
most importc nt of these companies was the Brotherhood Invest-
ment Co. of Cleveland, established in 1923, by the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, with a capitalization of $10,000,000;
These investment companies performed all of the functions
of the regular investment banking houses. Their principal
activity was underwriting large security issues and distri-
buting these issues among w/orking class investors. Stocks
and bonds which workers purchased from these companies were
usually paid for on the partial payment plan. It appeared
that these investment companies might exercise influence over
the concerns for vhich they marketed securities.
Through their new financial enterprises, the American
wage earners made interesting discoveries. Among these was
that industrial executives are as willing to cooperate and. to
run their business in the interest of the worker, when labor
is able to talk the language of business and to furnish the
funds as they ever were, to work in the interest of absentee
stockholders
.

7.
At the time of its inception, the labor banicing and
investment movements were thought to indicate a forecast of
an important share for organized labor in the control of
American industry. They were believed, to oe important means
of ushering in an era of real industrial cooperation, in
v. hich tne strike and many of the other weapons which labor
had been forced to employ in the past, in its struggle for
improvement, would be looked upon as relics of industrial
uarbarism.
barren S. Stone, hailed as ’’one of the chief leaders
of American working men" said, -
"Ho economic development in the world today is so
full of promise as the entry of organized labor into the
banking business. I believe chat che mobilized saving
power of workmen, employed through safe and intelligently
managed investment, will lift the whole relationship be-
tween capital and labor to a higher plane. It will teach
labor the problems and risks of capital, and it will teach
capital more common sense m its dec-lings with labor. We
have had war long enough, much too long. The time has
come to substitute reasoned cooperation for unreasoning
lorce," 1
.
The above statement was written in 1924, four years
after che founding of the first Brotherhood bank, and after
twenty-eight labor banks had been formed and applications
for sixty more lay on his desk. He aimed to make the work-
ing man feel at nome m the bank; to have him share in the
earnings after 10 per ceno nad been paid to depositors; to
receive interest on savings from the day his deposit was
opened until the day i t was taxen out, counting actual days,
a. Stone, Warren S. Labor's Chain of Banks
Worlds Ytf'orx. (November, 1924) p. 47

8 .
and to educate the v. orjici „o ^x^c his deposits in safe
markets through bond purchases.
The Mt. Vernon Savings Bank
A detailed study of the rapid growth in the number of
labor banks, in the resources of the banks and in the diverse
activities in which these banks participated will help us
to understand whether or not Mr, Stone’s hopes were realized.
The first labor bank in the United States was es-
tablished at Washington, May 15, 1920 by the International
Association of Machinists, one of the most progressive of
Americc n labor organizations
,
with a capital of $160,000
subscribed by the union and its members. This bank, the
Mt, Vernon Savings Bank was the pioneer in a new movement
among American workingmen which during the next five years
resulted in the establishment of 32 trade union banks in
industrial centers in all parts of the nation. The growth
of the deposits of this bank during the five-year period is
shown in the table:
Table I
Deposits of the Mt. Vernon Savings Bank
Washington, D. C., 1920-1925
May 15, 1920 (opening day) 379,982.86
May 15, 1921 1,610,646.89
May 15, 1922 1,925,158.72
1t
l
*
May 15, 1923
May 15, 1924
May 1, 1925
2,282,554.61
2,558,463.75
3,138,904.60 1.
9.
Washington is not an industrial center, and the growth
of the deposits of the Machinists Bank at the rate of half a
million dollars a year during its first five years, far ex-
ceeded the expectations of its founders. The labor banks
established in industrial centers, however, had a much more
rapid growth.
The International Association of Machinists, under the
presidency of W. H. -Johnston, acquired an interest in the
Commercial national, one of the largest commercial banks
in Washington, ultimately exercising a controlling voice in
the personnel and policy of the bank. In 1920, the machinists
organized the Mt. Vernon Savings Bank, writh a capital of
$100,000. In 1922 it had resources in excess of $2,000,000.
Both banks have retained bankers on their operating staffs,
and have enlisted outside stockholders and business men, as
directors. Neither bank has made a specialty of labor
financing, although the Mt. Vernon Savings Bank demonstrated
the effectiveness of credit when controlled by labor in
connection with the open-shop fight in Norfolk, Va. jg, The
promoters of this pioneer banking house did not venture even
to rive it a name that would indicate its affiliations—s o new
l.Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 674.
2. Organized Banking Goes into Banking on a Big Scale.
(*
l
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was the experiment, so widely at variance was the idea of
labor banking, from the established notions of financiers
and unionists, alike.
The banks at Washington and Cleveland were the only
financial institutions established by American trade unions
during 1920. This was a year of severe industrial depression
in the United States, when millions of men were without
employment, and vigorous campaigns were conducted by em-
ploying interests for reductions in wages and withdrawals
of the recognition extended to the independent trade unions
in many industries during the war period. 1.
As early as Nov. 14, 1923, we find these words of
praise concerning labor banks: "No workers 1 movement of
recent years has had the spectacular and galloping growth
of labor banking. Even workers 1 education which probably
comes next in rate of progress, does not match this growth
quantatively, or qualitatively." 2.
Banks of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
Much of the notice which the press throughout the coun-
try gave labor banks was then due to the activities of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. In 1923, they had a
membership of 90,000, paid monthly dues of 50 cents each
and were directed by officers who drew big salaries and
who were expected to give efficient management of their
union. A fund of several million dollars had been built
1. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 676.
2. Labor and Its Money. The Nation. CXVII (Nov. 14, 1923)
p. 545
I*
.
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up as a safeguard against possible strikes.
The Locomotive Engineers’ Cooperative Bank was the
first big commercial bank to be established by organized
labor. It was opened in Cleveland, II ov. 1920. This bank,
which was by far the largest bank owned outright by or-
ganized labor, started with a capita 1 stock of $1,000,000,
and in addition, a surplus of $1,000,000 was paid in. It
was the first of a chain of financial organizations con-
trolled by the Locomotive Engineers. All of the stock of
the bank was owned by the Brotherhood as an organization
or by individual members. It increased its deposits at
a rate approximately $5,000,000 a year. The deposits of
the bank on its opening day amounted to $650,971,77. Its
deposits July 1925 were $23,601,082. Additional state-
ments will attest to the confidence in this bank and to its
steady growth. "We got deposits from every state in tne
Union, and from the Canal Zone, Central America, Cuba,
%
Germany, Ireland and Mexico. We have more than 4,000 out
of town accounts, and leos than 1500 of them are members of
the B. of L. E." 1.
WarrenS. Stone is authority for information that
the directors of the bank wrere the grand officers of the
organization, although trained bankers were employed to
manage the bcnk. The bank adopted the word '’service” as
its motto, and immediately challenged existing bank
1. Stone, Warren S. op. cit. p. 49.
t < t
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practices in Cleveland. It kept its doors open until
3 P. M. ; paid fo ur per cent interest on savings deposits
from the date of deposit to the date of withdrawal; paid
interest on commercial deposits, and in a numb r of ways,
protected the depositor from practices adoptee, by the banks
to deprive them of interest by a variety of petty devices.
It refused to goin the Clearing House Association, because
the rules of the association would have bound the bank to
abide by "gentleman’s agreements" which would have pro-
hibited most of the things which the bank desired to do.
The bank did alx its clearing through the Federal Reserve
System, of which it was a member.
Despite many misgivings, the bank during its first
two yes.rs ’ existence, added each month a million dollars to
its resources. At the end of February 1922, its total
working assets amounted to $14,000,000, Deposits came from
individuals, from trade unions and from other international
labor organizations. Fo vigorous attempt was ma.de to reach
other labor organizations, nor had anything like the
potential resources of labor been deposited with it. But
every service that it rendered brought deposits. It made
loans to school teachers whom other banks refused to assist.
This established a school teacher clientele. It aided the
carpenters of Cleveland to build a labor temple. This
brought large deposits from the labor unions. Some good
real estate loans offered to it were rejected, because
: .
.
«
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the conditions demanded by brokers were oppressive to their
clients, while loans to commissions looking to the monopoly
of products, were refused.
Substantial loans were made in North Dakota to
relieve the agricultural distress. They were made on
warrants of cities ana school districts, which freed other
resources in the state for agricultural uses. The bank
purchased outright (1922) $900,000 of soldier bonus bonds
issued by the State of Ohio, which the bankers had conspired
to discredit, because the state refused to fix a high interest
rate. This made friends of the ex-service men. In many
ways the Brotherhood f Locomotive Engineers’ Cooperative
National Bank of Cleveland rapidly extended their operations.
Their banks grew in resources and new banks opened in
widely separated cities.
To control these banks, the Brotherhood set up a
system of holding companies, one with an initial capitalization
of $10,000,000. In seme of their holding ventures the
engineers cooperated with other railroad brotherhoods, or,
more rarely, with miscellaneous unions.
In 1921, two additional labor banks were so established
in small cities in the Middle Wes t and the Southwest. Their
capital was small, and it appeared for a time that the new
labor banking movement would have a very slow growth. 2.
1. Labor Enters the Banking Business. Literary Digest.
LXVII (July 24, 1920), p. 92
2. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 475
mi
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In Three Forks, Montana (1922), the workers organized
and controlled the First National Bank of Three Forks.
In Tuscon, Arizona, labor organized the Cooperative
Bank and Trust Company. Its deposits in March 1922, amounted
to $180,650; its capital to $70,000, and its total resources
to $262,188.
' Other labor banking organizations were in process of
formation in Pittsburgh, Ka.rrisburgh, Pennsylvania, and in
Birmingham, Alabama during 1922. In addition, the Brother-
hood of Railway Car Men of America] and the Railway Tele-
graphers
,
as well as one or two other railroad organiza-
tions authorized their executive officers to take the
necessary steps to organize banks, while the officers of
the American Federation of Labor were instructed by the
Denver Convention to investigate the subject of .banking
credit,*' 1.
After the establishment of the Cleveland Bank, rail-
road men in other parts of the country took the initiative
in the organization of banks. In San Bernardino, the
workers secured subscriptions amounting to $200,000 for a
labor bank. They made repeated applications to the
Comptroller of the Currency for a charter, but were unable
to get any encouragement. Finally they bought into the
control of an existing bank, and operated it as a cooperative
bank under the title of the Brotherhood Trust and Savings
Bank, with a control of the stock ownership.
By 1928, New York banking circles received two severe
shocks due to these facts;
(l) The Harriman National Bank considered the United
Mine Yorkers safe enough to lend them $100,000 on their own
s ecurity.
1. Organized Labor Goes into Banking on a Big Scale
Currenx Opinion LXXIII (October, 1922), p. 550,
I,
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(2) There was complete evidence of an extraordinary
development of labor banking in the United States, since
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers had bought a sub-
stantial interest in the Empire Trust Co., a bank whose
resources towlied $60,000,000; and the Brotherhood intended
to open another uan*. m hew York, in which all of the stock
would be owrned by their own members. in addition, the Central
Trades Union and the Labor Council of flew fork City and the
New York State Federation of La.bor, already had $300,000
subscribed toward the $2,000,000 capital. Is it any wonder
that this rapid growth attracted the attention that is evi-
denced by the wealth of material in periodicals of the time
x922-1923 which was a. reflection of the intense interest in
j.abor bank development?
I
Interpretation of Early G-rcv.^h
This very rapid growth meant tha.t labor wras recognizing
the importance of credit in industrial struggles; recognizing,
too, that whatever individual banks mignu do at a particular
moment, uhey must expect the oiu ^anks in general to be sus-
picious and unfriendly, and that they had in their own union
funds, and in the deposits of their members, an enormous
power which they had hitherto wasted. They know7 that credit
rules the world; that the industrial magnates with whom they
came in direct contact were often but the puppets of greater
financial interests Such investments were doubtless expected
.
V16.
to mean a tendency to conservatism in the unions; but they
also opened, "tremendous vista,s of labor, building a co-
operative world within the shell of the old profit-seeking
system." 1.
Commenting on "these democratically controlled banks,"
which had burst through the crust of the older financial
system all over the country, and whose deposits in 1923 ex-
ceeded fifteen to one, the money invested by the banks'
stockholders, Cedric Long said:
.*
It has been said the labor bai ks in this country have
nearly a hundred million dollars in their official treasuries.
Members of these unions must have more than a billion dollars
on deposit in the big be nks . The farmers probably have near-
ly as much again. If these depositors choose to become
their own bankers, it is quite conceivable that they can take
over the financing of the country."
After Mr. Long's article went to press, eleven more
banks were authorized, and were to be opened during the year.
Truly, labor seemed to be taking seriously to heart what Mr.
Stone said before the annual convention of Locomotive Firemen
in Houston in June 1922: "If you will use the power you hold
in your hands, in ten years, you can control the financial
policy of the United States." During 1922, industrial
activity showed^©me improvement, and at the beginning of 1923
it was evident that the country was entering upon a period cf
unusual prosperity. During that year six new labor banks
were added to the list.
Un to this time the movement had attracted little
1. Labor Banks
.
The Nation. (February 7, 1923) ;. 139
.
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attention either from capitalists or from students of labor
problems. Many of the leaders of labor themselves hardly
knew of its existence. There was no adequate realization
of the possibilities of the new movement on the part of any
of the leaders of trade unionism, v ith the exception of
those directly engaged in promoting its growth.
"Vhen the labor banking movement invaded Hew York, in
1923, however, the two large banks in the control of tne
organized workers were established in that city public
attention was attracted to the new- movement in the unions.
The significance of the movement was not understood, but it
was recognized as something that would bear watching. During
that year new labor banks were established in such important
centers as Chicago, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and
Minneapolis." 1.
Not only were new banks established, but various of
the larger anions began the purchase of large blocks of
stock in established financial institutions, which in the
past had played an important part in the capitalist system
of finance. The most important purchase of this nature was
the acquisition by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
of a one-third interest in the Empire Trust Co. of Nev/ York,
an institution holding $68,834,251 in deposits. Tv/o officers
of the Brotherhood were elected to the board of directors of
the Empire Trust Co. and it subsequently bec<. me known that
the Brotherhood had secured an option on a sufficient number
of shares of the banks stock to give it control of this im-
portant financial institution. A similar investment had been
made somewhat earlier by the International Association of
1. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 673.
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Machinists in the stock of the Commercial National Bank
of Washington, an institution holding $14,052,818 in
depos i ts
.
The needle trades union were the ne; t group to
take up the movement. In July, 1922, the Amalgamated
Cxothing Workers Union of America organized the Amalgamated
Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago and in April, 1923,
opened the first labor bank in New York City. In January,
1924, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union
also owned a national bank in New York City.
The Amalgamated Clothing Workers had long considered
the advisability of a bank, and e tablished the Chicago
bank with a capital stock of $200,000 and a surplus of
$100,000. "As this organization has a cohesive, easily
mobilized membership and intelligent leadership, its
success was confidently predicted." Within four months
its resources had grown to $1,500,000, and it had 3500
depositors. 1.
The Amalgamated was affiliated with the union known
as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; while the new bank,
the Federation Bank has as its president Mr. P. J. Brady,
the head of the Allied Printing Trades Council. Thus it
is seen that in New/ York, at least, the labor banks so far
established at this time were to afford banking facilities
both to the unions and the workers in a particular industry.
1. Thompson, Laura A. Labor Banks in the U. S.
Library Journal XLIX (March 15, 1924), p. 281
I.1 -
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Interesting ceremonies in Hew York attended the
opening of another bank,^the Federation Bank, v hich had
among its first depositors Governor Smith, Samuel Gompers
,
and Senator Copeland.
An entirely different group vas responsible for the
organization of the Federation Trust Company which was
opened in New York City in May, 1923, under the joint con-
trol of the New- York State Federation of Labor, the
Central Trades and Labor Council of Greater New York and
the New York Building Trades Council. This rapid develop-
ment of labor banks was regarded as a recognition by labor
of the key importance of credit in industrial struggles.
The purchase of a substantial interest in the
Empire Trust Co., New York, in 1923 by the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, which already had resources of near-
ly £60, 000, 000, meant that under the New York arrangement,
capital and labor were going to deal with each other on
even terms over a directors’ table. When this development
came it gave a different aspect to the situation as regards
labor banking. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
bought a large interest, reputed to have been 60 per cent,
in this old and conservative Empire Trust Co., in the heart
of the New York financial district. This move was epoch-making
in the history of union banks. It meant a definite alliance
with established capital ism. Mr. Stone not only had acquired
.....
—
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a "window on Wall Street," out in looking out that window
he found himself rubbing shoulders with business men and
financiers who represented other interests on the board of
directors. "From that time on it was evident that the
leaders of the engineers hah committed themselves to a
policy of cooperation with the established banking and
business system of the country. The intervening years
have seen a broadening of that cooperation." 1.
Comment from the New York Globe at the time, said
that the affiliation was of the highest importance, not
only as a development in banking, but also as the movement
of which it was a part might ultimately affect the whole
troubled matter of the relation between capital and labor.
Apparently the president and largest stockholder of
the trust company was satisfied with the new arrangement
for he said many complimentary things about the Brother-
hood in announcing the news
:
"Unaer arrangements that have been worked out, the
Brotherhood has purchased a substantial interest in the
Empire Trust Company. This arrangement unquestionably
will add many millions to the deposits of the latter in-
stitution. In all the negotiations with Mr. Stone and his
colleagues we have found them to be keen, capable, forward-
looking business men. They think straight, talk straight
,
end act straight. Throughout the negotiations our relations
have been most pleasant. 7/e will work together in close
harmony under the present management and organization of
the trust company, which will remain intact."
The Brooklyn Eagle thought, "The Brotherhood men
may get a new light on the railroad conditions and the
financiers may get a new l ight on the way Labor feels
1. Cowdrick, Edward S. The Bank with the Union Label
Industrial Management, LXX (October, 1925), p. 212

end thinks ii
The New York ^orld said, "The significance of this
step on the future of labor unionism and its relation to
capital in industry must be regarded as profound.”
The New York Herald believed participation by labor
in such an enterprise ought to York against class con-
sciousness
.
The Washington Post concluded, "Whatever way it is
viewed, this new alliance is an economic portent of first
magnitude, w7hose ramifications ana development will be
watched by all with a great deal of interest." 1,
Continued Growth of Labor Eanks
In the year 1924, eight new banks were established
by important trade unions and fo^r additional banks w^ere
established during the first quarter of 1925. In July 1925,
there were at least 15 new labor banks in process of or-
ganization, many of which were opened for business before
the end of 1925.
The labor banks (1925) then in operation in the
United States had an aggregate capitalization exceeding
$10,000,000, the bulk of -which had been subscribed by
trade unionists. At the beginning of the year 1925 they
had deposits of $86,017,645. Their resources were believed
to be in excess of $150,000,000. The resources of
capitalist banks in v hich various unions held large blocks
1. Labor Turning Capitalist. Literary Digest LXXVI
(February 3, 1923), p. 10
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of stock and would ultimately hold control were excluded
in the calculations which produced the figures given in
this paragraph. 1.
There is no parallel and no precedent in the in-
dustrial history of England or the continent of Europe for
this development of labor banking. In the old world there
have been cooperative banks, but these institutions, while
sometimes controlled by people belonging to the working
class, were seldom or never owned definitely by a trade
union or a district group of unions. Their relationship
to American labor banks is remote.
That the early successes of the first labor banks
had captured the imagination of the people of the country
can well be believed when we read:
"The resources of the labor banks thus far es-
tablished represent only a small fraction of the total
resources of the American oanking system. These banks
can not as yet be regarded as competing for control of
credit in the United States. Their growth both in
numbers and in resources during the first five years of
the movement, however, has been very striking. The
record of their success is the more remarkable when it
is realized that there have been more than 1000 failures
of capitalistic banking institutions in the United States
during the same period. He would be a foolhardy prophet
vrho would deny chat these banks are destined to play a
highly important part in the American banking system and
in the control of credit in the United States before
they are 10 years older."
Prom the growth indicated by the facts stated above,
it must be evident that the labor banking movement had
come to stay and also that it was rendering to the wage
1. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 676.
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earners hundreds of kinds of services which were undreamed
of when the first two of them were established in 1920.
The development of labor banking was phenomenal not
merely in extent, but because it occurred in a period of
assaults upon the union shop, unemployment --a time, in fact
when workers generally were still victims of the backwash
of post-war business depression, and of reactionary public
opinion.
"It is wortn while to note, also, that the growth of
labor banking in America has been accomplished against the
indifference, if not the hostility of the old-time leader-
ship. At the 1921 convention of the American Federation of
Labor the executing council gave a warning against labor
oanking. The organizations most influential in laying the
foundations of ohe new movement are the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, oho international Association of
Machinists, the Amalgamated (Jiothing Workers, and the
International Ladies 1 Garment Workers, two of these unions
the second and the last --are affiliated, it is true, with
the American Federation of Labor, duo all belong to the
progressive wing of the American Jbaoor movement and are
tolerated rather than liked by the u-ompers Machine.
Opposition to labor banking by the old-txme leaders is
probably less due to the idea, itself, man uO a sense that
ohe movement is outside of their peculiar abilities, iue-
ly to carry power away from the v;aUxiib delegate type of
men, and into the hands of more constructive and better-
trained persons. Still the old-school leaders evidently
recognized that they must fall in line, proof of which is
found in the establishment of the Federation Bank in New
York by the Gompers Group in New York labor, and the
announcement that John L. Lew/ is
,
president of the United
Mine Workers is to become the head of a new labor bank in
Indianapolis." 1.
Thus we see that despite post-war depression, re-
actionary public opinion and the indifference of the old-
time labor leaders, the labor banking movement had made
surpr ising /rrov/th during: the five years immediately
1. Labor and Its Money. The Nation. CXVII
(November 14, 1923), p. 545.
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following the establishment of the first labor bank.
In the labor banking movement, American wage earners
were developing new and constructive methods as opposed
to the negative and often destructive methods heretofore
universally employed in labor’s struggle for advancement.
According to Boeckel, old methods could not be abandoned
at once, and it was therefore to be expected that the
strike, the most destructive of all weapons, would con-
tinue to be employed for some years to come. The new labor
banking movement moreover, according to Boeckel, caught the
imagination of the American workingman. Through his banks,
he began to finance the operations of important industries
on a constantly enlarging scale. He began to see that
a man or a group of men by whom an industry is financed
may hcive a great deal to say about how that industry may
be run; he began to understand that in his nev; role of
financier he would be able ultimately to exert a far
greater influence over conditions in industry than he
ever had been able to bring to bear through the force of a
strike. 1.
New banks were opened by the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers during 1925, The Brotherhood Cooperative National
Bank at Tacoma, Washington was opened July 1, 1925. It had
on its opening day a capitalization of $200,000, surplus of
$40,000, deposits of $723,459, and total resources of
#1,012,418. The Brotherhood Bank and Trust Company at
1. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 679.
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Seattle, Washington, was opened August 1, 1925 with a
capital of $250,000 and a surplus of $50,000. 1.
Credit unions meet individual emergencies, not the
large needs of any group. It was because these group
needs must be increasingly met that democratic credit and
banking grew up on a large scale. Organized labor, in
particular, felt the need of being able to meet its own
emergency demands independently of the established bankers,
and in response labor banks sprang up all over the country.
Before the war, it was \ largely an& academic
question as to whether labor ought to go into business.
But larger wages brought a change: labor had more money;
their organizations had larger funds; they became cap-
italists and went into business because they had to put
their money to work. It becc.me a practical question, and
they answered it in the practical way. 2.
The Brotherhood was rich. It had funds said to run
into the millions, collected mainly from dues wrhich drew
interest in various depositaries or were invested in
securities. In fact, the profitable handling of this
money may be said to be at the bottom of the desire to
organize such a bank.
"The more labor becomes familiar with the economic
rules that apply to credit and the profitable use of
funds
,
the wider its outlook and the less inclined it
may be to look aska-nce at the efforts to work out the
problems of big money." 5.
1. Condition of Labor Banks, June 30, 1925.
Monthly Labor Review^. XXI. (Dec., 1925), p. 600
2. Labor Banks. World's Work. XLVIII, (Oct*
,
1924 )p. 582
3. Labor Enters the Banking Business. Literary Digest
(July 24, 1922), p. 92
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According to Warren Stone, who for tv/enty-five years
had been the Brotherhood’s chief, and v.ho concluded that the
road to labor advancement lay in controling instruments
of financial power:
"It has been the purpose of our organization to
further peace, liberty, and justice by entering the banking
field in New York, where hitherto no labor union has had
official connection with a financial institution. By
entering the field of economics through banking, the
Brotherhood feels it will be enabled to exert an influence
that will further develop those principles which underlie
all our endeavors." 1.
Those familiar with the first labor bank of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers wondered how large
financial institutions of the country would receive the
inovation in business. There were two reasons why the
labor bank and its successors were received cordially by
the large financial institutions.
1. they furnished service by encouraging thrift.
2, they dispelled some of the illusions about
banking.
A current periodical noted that of all the recent
new activities of the American labor movement, labor
banking has already proved to be the most fruitful. It
estimated that some of the labor banks have even in the
short period of their existence, shown that a type of
cooperative financial service can be developed which is
bound in the long run to have a profound effect on private
financial practice in this country. The growth of these
institutions far exceeded all reasonable expectations. 2.
1. Labor Turning Capitalist, op. cit. p. 10
2. What Labor Banks Must Do. Hew Republic. XLVIII.
(November 3, 1926), p. 288
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These banks were of tv o different types. In one type*
all of the shares were held either by union members individually
or by the union organizations. In the other, only 51 per
cent are held by them. The former type, however, seemed to have
increased more rapidly than the other. In the Cleveland
Bank, the Locomotive Brotherhood Bank, 51 per cent of the
stock belonged to the Locomotive Brotherhood as an associa-
tion and 49 per cent was owned by individual members of the
Brotherhood
.
Early hostility of loc< 1 bankers was shown to the
directing forces of the Cleveland Brotherhood Bank. The
county funds, deposited in their bank, when the Engineers'
Bank outbid the other banks for the business, were suddenly
withdrawn to the amount of $1,500,000, There came a cry
from certain quarters, too, that trade unions should be
put under the operation of the Sherman Anti-Trust law
exactly es unions of capital were.
"One law for all is what has made the American
Federal Reserve Banking System a success and what has
enabled these labor banks to spring into being. The trade
unions which have wisely organized these labor banks should
be held as responsible to the law when the combine to re-
strain traae, as they should be protected by law’ when they
combine to promote thrift." 1,
After 1926, there were evidences to indicate that
the labor banks were not increasing as rapidly as the
sanguine originally believed they would. For one, thing
organized American ls.bor had become more and more con-
servaiive c nu was giving 'up a large part of its activities
1. Labor Banks. Outlook. CXXXII. (Sept. 27, 1922) p.137.
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as entrepreneur; again, private bankers were not as hostile
as they formerly had been. During 1926 and 1927, for ex-
ample, the following labor banks were either sold to pri-
vate interests or discontinued;
Brotherhood of locomotive Engineer’s Cooperative
Trust Company, (N.Y.
)
Brotherhooo. Savings and Trust Company (Pittsburgh)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers’ Title and
Trust Company (Philadelphia)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers’ Bank and
Trust Company (Birmingham)
Brotherhood State Bank (Kansas City)
In this period (1926-1927) only two banks made their
appearance; viz;
Gary Labor Bank
Brotherhood National Bank (San Francisco)
Labor Banks Could Serve the Unions
Many illustrations could be cited to show how the
labor banks could be of service to strikers, directly or
inuirectly. Opportunities for service to the unions were
revealed to the pioneer labor banks, during the open shop
movement in 1920, At that time, powerful combinations of ta
capital took the offensive against the union and large
numbers of established banking institutions joined the open-
shop movement. Clearing-house associations in many d ties
adopted resolutions, "whereby the bankers pledged them-
selves to deny credit to all employers continuing to deal

n 1.
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with the unions and to pay the union scale of wages.
A continous flow of credit, under modern conditions, is
essential to the successful operation of any large
business enterprise, and any threat made that was
equivalent to denying new loans
,
or equivalent to a
refusal to renew old outstanding loans was a threa.t
against the existence of the enterprise. Few employers,
no matter how friendly they might be to the workers’
organizations, could deny such threats of suspension of
credits, and particularly in a period of business de-
pression. Hence, the bankers, by withholding credits,
were able to play an important part in the war against
the unions.
In a large number of cases during this open-shop
dr^ve, the labor banks were able to step in and supply the
necessary credits to manufacturers, who desired to con-
tinue their cooperation with the unions, but who would be
unable to secure new loans from the sources to which they
had formerly applied for loans. Where strikes were dialled
following the withdrawal of recognition of the union, the
banks encouraged the strikers to raise sufficient capital
to start their own enterprises, and promised adequate
operating credits
,
as soon as these enterprises had been
established. Many enterprises which v.^ere started in this
way during the open-shop drive grew into large enterprises,
owned and controlled by the workers themselves.
1. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 675
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However, during and since the open-shop movement,
all of the labor banks have wisely refrained from making
loans for the direct financing of strikes.
"A cardinal rule of labor banking is that loans
shall be made for productive purposes only. While there
are many cases on record in vhich loans have been made
by capitalist banks to trade union organisations for the
purpose of continuing strikes, which it suited the pur-
poses of the employers to have continued, the labor banks
have consistently looked upon strikes as anything but
highly speculative risks." 1.
Inbi rectly, without granting direct loans for
strike purposes, the labor banks could be of assistance.
One notable exanple is evidenced by the aid tne Machinists’
Bank gave in a painters’ strike in Washington (1925). When
the strike was called, the painters’ union announced that
it vrould bio. for painting contracts and that it would do
the work for sums sufficient to cover the cost of materials
and of labor at the union scale of wages
;
that the usual
profits accruing to the contractor, would be eliminated.
The trade was compdeteiy unionized, so the regular
contractors were une-ble to fulfill existing contracts when
the strike was called. Consequently
,
many of these con-
tracts and many new contracts were carried out by the
pa.inters ’ union. Whenever a contract was secured by the
union, it was taken to the bank, un the evidence of the
contract, loans were furnished by the bank in sufficient
amounts for the purchase of the required material. As soon
as the contract was discha rged, and pa.yment received by
1. Boeckel, Richard, op. cit. p. 678
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uhe union, the loans were repaid. Consequently, while the
painters were on strike against their old employers, they
were able oo enjoy full employment at the union scale of
wages, and were prepared to continue the strike indefinitely.
Under such conditions, it was evident that the employers
would grant one union sc^le of wages, or that the painters’
union would esto.brish a cooperative enterprise which would
result m occluding the old contracts from the trade.
Scores oi similar examples couxu i>e cited to give
some conception of methods by whimi uhe \orkers’ own money,
deposited in their own oaius was used to promote their ovm
interes ts
.
The xauur oanks were able to guarantee every working
uepooioor, that his funds, given into the care of me ^an*.
would always be used directly in the in leasts of the work-
ing class and never in order to promote the purposes of the
enemies of labor. On the other hand, banks, other than
labor banks
,
carried billions of dollars of American wage
earners in savings accounts. A considerable part of these
depiosits formed the money reserves upon which banks ex-
tended credits to industrial enterprises. During the
open-shop drive, these funds contributed to the bankers’ power
against the workers' organizations. In times of industrial
peace, these funds could be used in the promotion of
speculative enterprises in which the "workers were victims.
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Too, they could be used in the interest of the wage-
earning depositors, but there was no guarantee that they
would be so used.
In addition to offering unusual advantages to de-
positors and to stockholders, the labor bank was a source
of strength to the trade union. For one thing, it earned
for the union on its defense and insurance funds, a profit
in excess of the interest that these funds ordinarily
drew from commercial banks, and not only was it able to
supply funds for the sound enterprises of other unions
or cooperatives which might otherwise be left unaided,
it was in a position to discriminate in granting its
loans, between employers who were favorable and those who
were unfriendly to labor. Moreover, the existence of the
labor bank weakened the pressure that commercial banks
might exert on individual employers during strikes, by
withholding credit. A number of the labor banks were
depositories of stale and city governments and members
of the Federal Reserve System.
Criticisms and Recommendations for Management
After labor banks had been in existence six years,
and the height of the movement of launching labor banks
had been nearly reached, a lengthy article appeared in a
current periodical, the Few7 Republic, ITovember 3, 1926,
which set forth the requi rements of management and the
1
.
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"basic problems involved in the management of labor banks. 1.
An adequate machinery of administration and a skilled
and responsible personnel were the tv. o great requirements
noted as being the factors which organized labor must con-
struct to bring about and to continue in successful manage-
ment of labor banks.
The Brotherhood Savings and Trust Company of
Pittsburgh closed (1926) and this closing brought attention
to the basic problems of labor banking. 'While it was
obvious that banks, under whatever management will some-
times fail, whether because of the dishonest or unskilled
conduct of their affairs, yet to certain students of
banking, the problems of labor banks seemed likely for a
long time to be peculiar, and to require special handling.
First of all, labor banks needed to make increasing
use of the large numbers of persons, members of the or-
ganized labor movement, who had the knowledge and the ex-
perience, requisite to the careful and successful manage-
ment of a bank. With rare exceptions, there were not many
persons so equipped to be found in the movement. This num-
ber was bound to grow as time passed. However, it was advised
that trade unions should draw7 on those who had the proper
equipment, and not wait until they had educated and trained
their own men. Banks properly managed involve the setting
up of an elaborate system of checks on the daily detailed
operations of an institution. In every large American city,
1. What Labor Banks Must Do. Hew Republic XLVIII.
(November, 3, 1926), p. 288
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many men and women, experienced in all ..has es of industry,
investment, real estate, and commerce, were not only
available for this purpose, but eager to lend their ser-
vices to such institutions as labor banks.
"It has been one of the outstanding achievements of
this young movement that it has in some in. tances assembled
many such persons, who see in labor banks a fresh oppor-
tunity to satisfy their inclination for public service,
and who have already made valuable contributions as
members of an executive committee, or of the various ad-
visory groups associated with the multifarious functions
of a financial institution." 1.
A second requirement of very great importance is
frequent and expert audit. A£dit facilities were not?
provided by the Federal Reserve Ranks, the local clearing
house, and the State Banking Departments. This was another
bit of machinery of operation and investigation for its own
.full protection and for the reputation of the movement.
Y/hether organised labor approved of the labor banking move-
ment or whetner it had a formal connection or not, the
American Federation of Labor vas bound to bear the moral
responsibility for the defects ana the defaults of the
banks of its constituent unions.
Hence, it was recommended that as a piece of wisdom,
the Federation should create an auditing service of its
own in order to make quick and independent audits of
those labor banks in v/hose healthy condition, it had a
moral, if not a financial interest. The gains, as a re-
sult of audit would be of tvpo kinds: l) direct gains in
1. Ibid. p. 269.
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more careful management, would be unquestionable; 2) the
indirect gains, by way of comparative information regardirg
the practices of various banks, and of the diverse policies,
would be equally great. ITeglect of one of its most im-
portant functions of labor banking, its educational by-
product, was a matter not to be tolerated.
As early as 1926, the public was cautioned to pin its
faith only to institutions, owned and managed by responaible
labor organizations. This seemed wise for the enterprise
of labor banking had received extensive ana favorable
publicity. The public was advised, so the New Republic
tells us to scrutinize the list of promoters end organizers
of both new and already existing labor banks, and to make
certain that such banks were not managed by individuals
whose relation to the labor movement was personal, and not
official. It was even recommended that administrations of
the various unions or groups of unions, be investigated be-
cause labor banks dej:ended for their grov th on public con-
fidence and support.
The recommendations for improvements in the management
of labor banks, after six years of apparent success could be
accomplished without any sacrifice of a new and cooperative
policy of cooperative banking.
"Centralized and responsible audit would in fact fur-
nish an essential test of the practicability of alternative
policies. Experts from the outside, far from throwing the
weight of h.eir influence against the cooperative principle,
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could in general be expected to support it because it has
been the cooperative notion that has enlisted their interest,
and captured their imagination. " 1.
Favorable Comments
When a movement of as great significance as labor
banking takes hold upon the interests of great masses of
people, it is always interesting to note how such a move-
ment impresses the minds of men of great interest in the
country and beyond its confines.
Mr. Charles E. Mitchell, president of the National
City Bank of New York was asked his opinion of the enter-
prises of labor. Mr. Mitchell replied tia t apart from that
view of the service to be rendered by labor banks, these new
institutions would perform a service for the general welfare,
by leading the labor organizations into other business fields,
so that in time, labor, v ith a new conception of the func-
tions of industry and business, Till bring about a more
sympathetic cooperation betveen capital and la,bor.
"We do not think that the wage earners should be
nothing but employees," said Mr. Mitchell, "but that they
should plan to share in ov/nership. The modern form of
corporate organization makes it possible for thousands of
persons to participate in the ownership of an industry
either as stockholders or bondholders, and we believe it
will be good for the country to have the railroads and
larger industries owned in this manner. We do not want
a sharp line drawn between owners
,
and workers
,
but rather
that the tv o shall be the same, or closely intermingled.
The result will be better understanding and more effect-
ive cooperation."
1. World's Wrork. Vol. XLVIII. No. 6. Oct. 1924
"March of Events
.
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In a statement credited to Mr. Mitchell, and released
by the official organ of the banks and investment companies,
operated by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Mr.
Mitche-1, said:
"There has been in the past an air of mystery about
the banking business. A grest many good and sincere people
have not understood the service which banks render in the
community and have believed that they enjoyed special
privileges of some kind, end were parasites on industry.
That idea has tended to cause ill-feeling and antagonism
toward business, and no amount of argument or protest on
the part of bankers themselves co^ld overcome it. How it
has been demonstrated by the labor banks that banking is not
a privileged business, but is o^en to all, and that it
performs useful functions in society. That is one of the
reasons why from the start we have welcomed the labor bank,
because it banishes mystery and unders tand.ng. "1.
At the opening of one of the new labor banks
,
Governor Alfred E. Smith of Hew York remarked, "Such an
enterprise will impress upon the mind of labor some of the
problems of business. It will impress upon the mind of
business some of the problems It bor is pressing to have
solved." 2.
The bulletin of the national City Bank of Hew York
had a friendly v.ord for labor banks. This bulletin belittled
the injections of any significant innovations into banking
practice, as a result of the establishment of labor banks.
It asserted that the idea of cooperation
,
in the sense of a
division of profits with customers, was not new; in any
line.
1. Labor Banker
2. Outlook, May 50, 1923.
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"One of the most distinct services these banks will
renuer will beiin demonstrating hov; little there is in
the idea entertained in some quarters that banking is a
ousine. s of privilege and that banks do nothing that is
beneficial to the common man. The labor banks have all
the privileges that any other banks ever had, and if they
can demonstrate their ability and willingness to render
better service than other banks do, they will walk away
with the Dusiness. If they encourage the practice of
thrift, teach the value of private wealth to the community,
and help to inculcate respect for property rights, as may
be expected, cankers generally will rejoice in the progress
of the movement." 1.
Professor T. IT. Carver, head of the economics de-
partment of Harvard University said that as a result of the
financial movement among the workers
,
the United States was
witnessing an economic revolution. He felt that there was
abundant evidence in support of his statement that this
financial innovation v/as "the only economic revolution any-
where in the world that amounts to a hill of beans." 2.
In Gre< t Britain, the American labor banking movement
was being held up by the responsible leaders of the British
Labor Party, as an example for British v/orkers to follow/.
.even ohe conservative leaders appear to look upon the move-
ment with favor, and the concluding paragraph of "Labor’s
5
Money" v/as very frequently quoted in the arguments :
"While the end sought in this movement is a
4
revolutionary as any radical reformer could wish, the means
lor its acnievement hold no threat of industrial disruption
or public disorder. The movement does not look to the over-
throw/ of capitalism. On the contrary, it accepts the in-
stitution of a capitalistic society and seeks to v/ork, through
capitalistic methods toward a new social order." 4.
1. Literary Digest. Vol. LXXV. Ho. 5. Oct. 21, 1922, p.72
2. Pan American Bulletin Vol. LX. Ho. 7. July, 1925 p.681
3. Boeckel
,
Richard. Labor’s Money. LIX. p. 173
4. Boeckel, Richard. .Labor’s Money, p. 173
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Mr. Philip Snowden, Chancelxor oi Exchequer in the
MacDonald cabinet discussed the success which attented the
the new adventure of labor bankers and noted among other
things the surprise and satisfaction orthodox bankers of
the United States expressed at the success of toe movement,
and the reasons which Mr. Stone set forth as directing the
founding of the Brotherhood Banks. Mr. Snowden was inter-
ested in observing that ti ese banks observed the function
of the ordinary commercial banks, that the banks did not
encourage their depositors to keep their savings in the
banks, but recommended these depositors to invest their
accumulated savings in well-s ecured bonds. He felt that
these banks were performing a great service. The advan-
tages which such working class efforts as these American
labor banks confer upon the workers, he believed to be
indirect rather than direct:
'•Labor banks will not secure the financial control
of the operations of trade and commerce. They will make
little impression in that respect. But they w/ill indirect-
ly do a great deal to benefit the working man. They will
encourage thrift, and give to the proceeds of thrift
greater security. They will assist what has been the
greatest achievement of the great cooperative movement in
Greet Britain, which is not the fact that it has built up
the most colossal trade organization in the country--but
that it has built up a nev; working class, with a wider
experience, a wider outlook, filled with a confident be-
lief in its own capacity and in the future of democracy." 1.
However, Mr. Snowden felt that the United States was
a long way behind Great Britain in the matter of cooperation
in its varied forms among the working classes, but that in
the establishment of the labor banks, both countries had
1. World’s Work. Vol. 49. Ho. 5. March, 1925. p.

40
one result in common, the encouraging of thrift for the
working class. He realized that it was much easier to
establish labor banks in the United States than in Great
Britain, where banking had become almost a closed cor-
poration, because of an important difference in the
banking system. To start or to maintain an independent
commercial bank outside of the Big Five would be almost
imposs ible
:
"This American movement (labor banking) aims at
securing workers’ control of industry by employing
workers’ savings in capitalist concerns . ---The ag-
gregate capital of the working classes must run into the
thousand million. It needs little imagination to con-
ceive what a tremendous financial power this capita.1
would give the worked, if it were aggregated and used
to secure © ntrol of industries*" 2
In the preface to Labor’s Money, by Richard
Boeckel, another famous Britisher remarked that if
only some part of the immense sums expended by the
working class on the maintenance of strikes could be
devoted to investment in industrial enterprises of
their own, they would stand a much better ch nee of
attaining those great and legitimate objects of their
des ire--regulari ty of employment and a higher status
than that of mere instruments of production. Hence,
he, too, agrees with Boeckel in the latter’s optimism
that through labor banks
,
the workers may look toward
a new social order.
Again, a third Britisher- voices his opinion in
favor of the nev labor be nks of the United States.
1. Bulletin of Pan American Union. Vol. 59
ITo. 7. July, 1925. P. 673-661
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"The truth is, that labor can use, and may use,
without forfeiture of any of its rights or duties, or
aspirations, the medianism of capital for tne better-
ment of human society. If labor could and v.ould use
its earnings, not in strikes, but in the financing of
production, we should get reconciliation. Te should
get it, too, through the recognition of the silent
third part in indus try--the consumer. He would bless
the union of c&_ ita.1 and labor."
Thus did J. St. Loe Strachey, in ’The Spectator,’
discuss "Labor Banks in the United States." 1.
Features of the Labor Banks were set forth in
qn article
of current
1)
2 )
S)
4)
by Dr. Harry Laialer, writer on subjects
economic thought.
Voting by shares of stock instead of by
the cooperative one-man one-vote system.
Dividends on stock, usually limited to
ten per cent.
All earnings in excess of ten per cent
being divided among depositors in pro-
portion to their deposits with the bank.
The number of shares that may be owned
by the individual is limited, this num-
ber varying with the va.rious banks.
Dr. Laialer classified the banks as to organiza-
tion into four groups.
1) those established and controlled by one
union for the benefit of itself and its
members
.
2) those formed by groups of traae-unions in
one industry.
3) those organized by the various unions of
a particular locality.
4) those started as regular commercial banks,
but whose stock has been purchased in whole
or in part by la.bor-organizations . 2.
1. Pan American Bulletin. LIX. Fo. 7. July, 1925.
2. Laidler, Harry. The Forward March of Labor Banks
Monthly Labor Review. XXI, (Cct., 1925) p. 224.
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"The majority of the directors of such bi nks must
be members of the trade union or unions controlling the
bank, althouth an effort is usually made also to induce
business men and economists sympathetic organized labor to
become members of the governing board i na assist with
advice as to loans, investments, etc. But always
,
when
the bank is owned by one union or a group of unions, in-
sistence is made that the general policies of the banks
should be laid down by the trade-union group who regard the
success of the trade-union movement as of primary im-
portance." 1.
The immediate advantages conferred by labor banks
according to Harry Laidler are:
1) payment of a higher rate of interes t--this
being computed from the time of deposit to
the time of withdrawal.
2) a substantial return to shareholders.
b) small loans at reasonable rates to union
members on character indorsement.
4) a special service for those desiring to
send money abroad.
5) information and advice on financial pro-
blems
.
6) aid to cooperative societies and other
socially useful enterprises of a sound
charac ter
.
Dr. Laidler expected that the labor-banking move-
ment would as it expanded, have considerable influence in
determining the attitudes of employers toward organized
labor.
The intangible benefits which the movement confers
were, --a keener insight into actual workings of our whole
industrial and financial structure. Such knowledge could
1. Laidler, Harry, op. cit. p. 225.
- J
t
<
-
45.
be exceedingly valuable in the determination of trade-
union policy.
"It gives the leader a better access to facts re-
garding the condition of the market, the profits that
are being made in industry, the demands for labor in
different businesses and different parts of tne country,
and the general trends of business --facts which must be
known if a vise course is to be marked out in the onward
march towards better living conditions •
"
Dr. Laialer answered some criticisms made of labor
banks. That such a bank may fail to employ banking ex-
perts was the first criticism. In his reply, Dr. Laialer
pointed out that thus far (1925) the workers had been wise
enough to employ trained technicians with a thorough
knov/ledge of their business, and to secure the advice of
still other experts.
In answer to the charge that it might lend money
on poor security to persons or groups in whom it is
interested, in which ase, if it was controlled by one
union or a small number of unions, an industrial crisis
or strike in the trade of these unions might cause a
run on the bank; or the employing interests might cause
at such a time engineer a run. The failure of such a
bank would harm the trade union movement generally.
The reply was comprehensive and answered all three
suppositions
:
a) Those connected with labor banking assert that
they have -pursued an even mor e cons erva.tive policy in
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regard to investments than the average commercial bank
avoiding speculation and investing only in the safest
s ecur i ti es
.
b) It is s to. tea tnat mos t of the lcxbor banks
belong to the Federal Reserve System and that therefore
a. successful run on one of them is most unlikely.
c) The labor banks endeavor to draw their de-
positors from as many classes as possible; thus mini-
mizing possible danger from depression in any one trade
or industry.
In the case of the International Union Bank, the
Amalgamated Bank, and of the Locomotive Engineers’, from
three-fourths to nine-tenths of the deposits come from
outside of the union. Business men, labor men in other
trades, and professional workers in the neighborhood make
up the bulk of deposits. As a result, during the foir -week
strike among the workers of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
during June and July 1924, according to Vice-President
Potofsky, the deposits in the union bank actually increased.
Bor did the workers on strike seem inclined to take cut more
of their savings than are absolutely necessary. So far as
the unions themselves were concerned, they made effort to
finance the strikes as much as possible from assessments
rather than from reserves built up by the union ahead of
time.
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Still a third serious criticism of labor banks was
answered by Dr. Laidler, that v.hen a union enters the
banking field, it incurs obligations making it less free
to strike and to prosecute that strike with vigor. This
criticism has come from within the labor movement itself.
Dr. Laidler replied that while this is possible and that
while ©me unions have tied up their funds
,
they have done
it not through labor banks, but through investment com-
panies, and other ventures. The vice-president of the
Amalgamated Bank replied to the above criticism:
"I doubt if the question of the union’s connection
with the bank enters in the least in President Hillman’s
consciousness or in that of any of the other officers in
making a decision for or against a strike. Of course,
frequent strides do not connote a progressive union nor
do fev/ strikes, a conservative one. a strike should be
resorted to only when everything else has failed. it
often means great misery to the workers. Machinery for
adjustment should be worked out in somewhat the same way
as we have done in Ohicago and elsewhere. A possible
danger arises when a trade-union oi ixk. lends money to
business men employing the members of the union con-
trolling the bank. Fear lest injury to the business of
such a customer through a strike might mske it difficult
for him to pay oack his loan, might have its effect on
the calling of a stride. Seeing this danger, we in our
bank refused to lenu mone^ uo those who employ non-union
members. We realize the cmn^ex «o the union of having
nonliquid assets, and have repcctculy refused to go
into ventures which would tie up iar& ooms of money for
any length of time.”
That the laoor-ban^mg activities diverted the
energies of the unxwu officers from the primary job of
the union was the xouxth serious criticism of the
management of lauux panics
.
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Tms oojection was denied by Dr. Laidler. Many
union wiiiuers serve the bank merely to see that the
unions’ interests are protected. He declared that the
information they gain makes them more efficient officers
of che union. In some cases, furthermore, he pointed
out that labor banking, as political action, does pro-
vide an opportunity to a labor leader who gets some-
what tired of organization work to serve labor in other
lines instead of stepping out into the field of business.
"The danger of diverting too much energy away from the
union work can be guarded against somewhat by paying but
one salary to an officer both of a union and a bank,
and by having that salary come from the trade union." 1.
A study in 1925 showed that thus far the sponsors for
the movement have adhered to the principles of sound
banking. Rarely has the management of a bank been en-
trusted to amateurs. Labor leaders could sit on the
board of directors, but in the tellers’ cages and behind
the cashier’s desk were usually to be found trained bank-
ers, as experienced, as cautious, and if necessary, as
"hard-boiled" as are the officials in the "capitalistic"
bank across the street. "Incidentally, it may be here
noted that the employees of labor banks rarely were
unionized.
"
Question arose as to what use labor banks would
make of their financial power. In other words what were
1. Laialer, Harry, op. cit. p. 225
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tiie intentions of the labor leaders as to the use of the
power which would come to them if through br nking or in
other ways, they succeeded in concentrating any consider-
able part of the financial resources of the working popu-
lation of the country. This question re; lly resolves it-
self more directly to this one, "Will labor banks become
involved in controversies between unions and employers,
and use the funds of workingmen for the promotion of
unionism," 1.
Search for an answer to this question discloses a
maze of contradictory statements, and of words and of
actions, that seem to have little relation to each other.
In a circular letter of Peter J. Brady, president of the
Federation Bank of New York, dt ted February 5, 1924, the
following statements are significant:
"The primary reason for the establishment of the
Fedemtion Bank of New York W'as that evidence before
Congress, federal and state commissions disclosed con-
clusive proof that it was the money of the working people
in the banks of the country that was being used to our
detriment" "Bankers and financiers through their power
of withholding credit and calling loans, have forced upon
fair employers a system of blacklisting union men and an
agreement to run only on the ’open-shop’ basis." --To
help remedy these evils, the Federation Bank of New York
was organized.
"There is no doubt that under some d rcumstances a
labor bank could, if it wanted to, throw its financial
weight on the side of a union in a controversy with em-
ployers. It could do this crudely and directly by ex-
tending credit liberally to employers v horn it is con-
sidered ’fair’ and by withholding or withdrawing it from
those who failed to come to terms with unionism. From
the former expedient, labo r banks prob; bly would be re-
1. Cowdrick, Edward S. op. cit. p. 212
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strained either by lavs or by the precepts of sound banking--
and for these precepts there is every evidence that the
union bankers have the highest respect. If bank deposits
have been turned directly into strike funds, there is no
evidence of it; probably it has not been done.” 1.
"As to discrimination in the granting of credit, the
case is less clear. It is not unlikely that s ore labor
banks have looked upon this sort of discrimination as a
glegitimate means of favoring their friends." * But this
practice, if it has existed, appears not to have been
carried to an extent that has constituted a serious abuse
of power. The possibility of harm is discounted by business
men and employers. Said a prominent New York banker;
"If a labor bank should discriminate against some
applicants for loans and in favor of others
,
it would
simply mean that those sorrowers who were not favored by
the labor ba_ k would get their money somewhere else.
Moreover, it is not true that a customer whose patronage
is valued by a bank will allo\ his policies as to the
management of his business be dictated by any banker. If
a bank should attempt this dictation in matters outside
its proper field of finance and credit, the result x ould
s igiply be that its customers would tcke their accounts
s omewhere els e .
"
Frederick C. Howe, writing in Labor Age, says that
"labor organizations have become interested in hanking mainly
because of the problems connected with handling the large
sums of money in their hands, and also from a realization
that labor was not using its power to the fullest when it
confined itself to collective bargaining."
16 r—ini luences
, says Hr, Howe, were;
1. Cowdrick, EdwordS. op. cit. p. 212
2.. Ibid.
.
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’•The recent organized assaults by the banking
associations of the country on organized labor through
coercive measures applied not only on railroads, mines,
and the major industries, but on factory owners, con-
tractors, and employers generally. This nation-wide war
upon the closed sho x , existing wages, and conditions of
labor, w;as inspired largely by banks not only in New York,
but in local communities all over the co ntry."
"In addition, men are coming to realize that
credit rules the world. Industry is fast passing under
banking control. The railroads, mines, trusts, and major
industries are already ban-controlled industries, while
the tendency all over the country is for economic power
to pass into the ha.nds of those who control credit."
"The cooperative movement is fast assuming pro-
minence in the minds of labor, as it is among farmers, as
a means of still further mobilization of economic power.
The cooperative movement needs credit, the credit which
it cannot secure from the existing banks."
"The wages of labor run into the billions. The
savings of labor run into billions more. They need only
to be mobilized under the control of labor, as they are
now; mobilized under the control of private bankers, to
give labor a position of pov;er."
Causes for the Start and Grov/th of Labor Banks
1. The wealth of some unions
Their accumulated resources maae it easy for
unions to engage in business enterprises.
They had erected office buildings, dispensed
insurance, and pensions, and conducted homes
for their invalid or superannuated members.
d, The purchasing power of the members of the unions
These members were employed at wages, which in
purchasing pow/er were two or three times as
large as those of workers in Europe, and were
able to save and invest greater sums of money
than laboring men ever saved or invested before.
/ a. The need for safe investments for workers 1 earnings
t t
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Warren S . Stone, late president of tbe -Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers and at his death
head of the largest group of union hanks, cited
this urgent need for some means of protecting
the funds of laboring men and of their widows
and orphans.
4. The desire for power
Warren S. Stone liked pov/er
—
power for himself,
for his organization, and for labor. To best
illustrate Hr. Stone’s conception of the situ-
ation, his own words tell the story of his aim
in this respect. 1,
"Labor organization in the United States, and in
every other country," he wrote to a correspondent
,
"can,
if they so desire, build up vast accumulations of capital.
We know that those who control the money of a country, as
a r-le, can control the policies of the country. 1 be-
lieve that if labor will pool its earnings and work for a
common purpose, eventually labor will be strong enough,
politically and financially, to make it.: elf felt in every
country in the world, and when labor attains this power, it
should only be used for the welfare of the country and for
the people as a whole."
Perhaps nobody else could answer to a certainty what
this power v/as for. Doubtless, labor bankers themselves had
hazy and conflicting notions as to what was to be done with
the powerful financial instrument which undoubtedly would be
created by the mobilization of any considerable part of the
working population of the country.
Perhaps there was a fifth cause in the minds of the
labor bank pioneers --a psychological motive.
There seemed to be a time --honored notion throughout
the history of the labor movement that there was one field
that w/as beyond the retch of the wage-earner--the field of
finance. Here the employer and the capitalist were conceded
1. Stone, Waren A.
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to reign supreme.
As regards this notion, Mr. Stone wrote in Y/orlds’
Work, (November, 1924):
"Y/hen labor stepped into the banking field a little
more than three years ago, most observers regarded it as a
revolutionary move, They confidently ex_ected these
new banks would fail. Hovr could mere workmen succeed in a
business so complex and so abtruse? One of the first
things we learned was that banking is neithen complex nor
abstruse. There is no mystery about it.” 1
"The anticipated pioneer activities of labor banks have
in a few cases been realized. Dollar remittances into
Russia at a time Then there were no channels for the safe
transmission of money from individuals in the United States
to aheir families and friends was a Service begun by a labor
bank. Small loans to wage earners at reasonable rates is
another service initiated by a bank owned by organized labor.
A labor bank again, originated the device of ihe long-term
loan to workingmen, by which method it has been possible to
finance workers’ ownership of apartments and to develop
cooperative housing. YThere, finally, the labor bank has been
successful and has been adding steadily to its resources, the
indirect contribution it has made to t^ e prestige and in-
fluence of the trade union in many unforseen directions has
far exceeded the hopes of its founders." 2
"In dwelling upon the growth of la.bor banking, the
observer should guard himself age ins t the thought that in
the number and size of the ba.nks lies the most significant
element in the movement. The fact is that up to the present
the magnitude of labor banking, while respectable, is not
particularly impressive. There are single banks in New/ York
City that have more money on deposit than is to be found in
all the la.bor banks together. It is in the possible future
development of labor banking, and in its effects, present
and prospective, upon unionism, finance, and industry, that
we should look if we wish to find the real significance of
the enterprise." 3
Deficiencies from Vrhich Labor Banks Suffered
It is admitted by practically all students of this
labor banking movement that the deficiencies from w/hich the
labor banks suffered were: ?
1. Stone, barren A.
2. Wolman, Leo. Labor Banking after Ten Years
New Republic. LX (August 21, 1929), p. 11.
Boston University
Bchool of Education

1) lack of direction and unity, and
2) lack of resourcefulness and executive skill.
The great disaster of the labor banking movement has
unquestionably been the failure of the financial enterprises
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ’ hich were launched
under the direction of "'arren Stone and comprising a nation-
wide chain of banks, investment companies, and collateral
real -estate and industrial enterprises that quickly grow to
huge proportions.
"The history of the more spectacular of these under-
takings, such as the Coal River Colieries which soon after
its purchase, involved the Locomotive Engineers in grave
difficulties with the United I'ine Workers and the real es-
tate development of Venice, Florida is common know ledge." 1
Facts made known indicate that the collapse of uhe
venture was due to the lack of plan and simple foresight,
and to gross mismanagement. The losses to the union, in
part, ma.de up by a heavy special assessment on its members,
and to individuals, members, and non-members
.
There seems to be no satisfactory single explanation
i or the unsuccessful experiences of the American labor
movement with oanks and other financial activities. Wolman
says, "The root of the matter is to be found in a.ncient and
traditional habits of organized labor, which account for the
long list of failures in cooperative undertakings that dot the
history of American labor." "When he adds that any of the
losses encountexeci m ohe daily routine of the business of
1.dolman, Leo. op. cit. p. 11.
I*
a labor organization, are the result of nothing more than
s impi e c*diixn j.s tra t iv e incompetence, he seems to have stx'Uojx.
the real note,
Yolman further declares u..at when loose methods of
thinking and acting are transferred bodily to such a sensi-
tive institution as a bank where mistekes of judgment do not
cancel out, the consequences are bound to be cumulative and
disastrous. The effects of the unsound economic policy and
inept administration flower slowly in the operations of
collective bargaining and are obscured by many accidental
circumstances. But bad commercial loans and improper in-
vestments are brougnt to light finally in the periodic
annual or semi-annual examinations by the State Banking
Deportment or the Comptroller of Currency.
Indifference to essential standards of adminis tration is
manifested in the prejudice of trade unions in carrying into
new experiments and unfamiliar activities --old habits and
methods
.
In the main the fourteen bonks which have gone out of
business were banks directly or indirectly controlled by the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers:
Some suffered outright liquidation.
Some were sold to private interests.
Some w/ere merged with private banks.
The International Union Bank of Uev York City w/as sold
to private interests in Ilarch 1928
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The Brotherhood Savings and Trust Company of
Pittsburgh failed in October, 1926. 1
Analysis of the Labor Banking Movement
The Banking Standpoint
In any analysis of the labor banking movement, it is
impossible to adequately discuss the matter without present-
ing the measure of success from the banking standpoint as
well as from the labor standpoint,
While statistics alone ere colorless, they are es-
timable from the banking standpoint. Growth and decline of
the more significant items appearing on bank statements of
condition, and the records of dividends paid relative to
investment, are fair evidences of the success of the move-
ment when measured in terms of money.
The number of banks grew slov.ly during the depression
of 1921, but from 1922 on, the growth w<_ s both rapid and
steady until in 1925, a maximum of 36 banks was reached.
The last labor bank was added in December 1926, but termi-
nations of already existing banks began in 1925, and by
1926, terminations of existing be nks exceeded initiations of
n ew banks
.
There appeared to be at least three reasons for a
change in trend. Out of seventeen terminations, six were
due to causes which were related to the situation existing
in the Engineers* system. Prior to the disclosure of the
1. Wolman, Leo. op. (fit. p. 11
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misfortunes within this system, however, resistance to the
growth of the entire labor banking movement had been
generated by the failures of banks in 1925 and in 1926, and
by opposition or futile promotions in various querters.
Rapid increase in deposits in the Cleveland bank
caused the total of all labor banks to rise rapidly from
the oeginning. Despite the elimination of fifteen banks
after the middle of 1926, the deposits did not decline, until
the decline of Engineers’ Banks, and therterminat ions of some
of these banks, caused too great a reduction, for the growth
of deposits to offset.
An accompanying chert, which in simple manner measures
success is here shown in Chart I:
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The interest rates v. ere comparatively high in the
early years
,
due to the quick returns made by the En-
gineers’ Cleveland Bank. Many non-paying banks brought
down the rate in 1924, and only after every bank had been
in existence two years (1928), and after one-hall the banks
were on a dividend paying basis, did the returns as in-
dicated exceed three per cent.
Table II
Yearly Returns to Stockholders on pa,id-in Investment 1
(all labor banks
)
t- r f * *
Lumber
of
Banks
.
Inves tment Dividend Per cent
return on
ves tment
1920 1 240,000 61,600
1921 3 1,400,000 115,750 4.40
1922 7 1,871,000 130,875 6.18
1923 14 4,058,000 134,850 3.22
1924 25 7,641,270 235,600 1.76
1925 29 9,806,570 323,200 2.40
1926 36 12,366,600 313,200 2.61
1927 33 11,355,000 309,625 2.75
1928 28 9
,
970,000 3.10
By reporting on only those banks
tinued, though many banks are included
dividends, a somewhat better return is
Table III:
which have con-
which have not paid
indicated, in
Table III
Yearly Return to Stockholders on paid-in Investment 2
(continuing labor banks
)
1. The Labor Banking Movement in the United States
Industrial Relations Section. Princeton University
p. 232.
2. Ibid. p. 234
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Number
of
: Banks
Investment Dividends Per cent of
return on in
ves tment
1920 1 240,000
1921 2 1,340,000 61,600 4.59
1922 3 1,395,000 111,500 7.99
1923 9 3,345,000 112,500 3.36
1924 14 4,574,000 119,600 2.61
1925 17 6,577,500 166,600 3.34
1926 22 7,704,000 291,200 3.77
1927 22 8,004,000 293,850 3.67
1928 22 8,559,000 309,625 3.61
Our discussion will first deal with hanks which con-
tinued under labor control. The size and growth of three
banks caused them to receive a great deal of attention as
examples of the labor banking movement. These three banks
.
were the New York Federation Bank, the Cleveland Engineers’
Bank, and the New York Amalgamated Bank, whose deposits and
resources combined, equal approximately those of all other
labor banks. The former declined in resources in 1927, and
the ocher two banks continued to show growth.
These three banks differ in personnel end in policies.
The Federation Banks represent the efforts of the con-
stituent unions of the American Federation of Labor and of
the New York Federation of Labor to establish a successful
labor institution. It has aimed to obtain prestige fore
labor, and with this end in mind, has not only drawn upon
a cross section of the labor movement for support, but has
developed wide contacts outside of labor circles, in its
*J
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commercial banking business. The Engineers’ banks, some-
what of a cog in the wheel of the Engineers’ Systems, has
aimed in its policies during the past, toward advaning or
securing prestige for the Brotherhood, and for the partisan
interests of the group in power in the Brotherhood. The
convention of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in 1927
disclosed heavy losses, extravagant expenditures and mis-
management as well as unwarranted previous records of
prosperity and of dividends paid to stockholders.
In both the New York Eed ration Dank and in the
Engineers’ bank in Cleveland, the urge to succeed was for
the sake of prestige. The Federation bank had much
surer and more successful standards of banking, and has
demonstrated the s.bility of the labor officials who
sponsored it, to develop a large and representative bank.
The Amalgamated Dank of New York has succeeded in
a.rous ing confidence in the bank and in the present union
administration, ana its policies havebeen cautious and
progress ive.
The Telegraphers’ bank in St. Louis, one of the leaders
in the laoor oanking movement, made a steady growth in re-
sources from 1923 to 1927. it has plodded a straight course
as a successful, conservative Danx controlled by a. strong
national union, but little influenced m policies by its
labor connections.

o9
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The Paterson hank has not ceased in its upward trend.
The tulerxs ’ hank seems to have a good future. It has
reaffirmed its interest in the needs of labor, by the es-
tablishment of an active small loan department.
The first l&bor bank, that of the Machinists, founded
in 1920, showed a steady growth until 1^26 then poor manage-
ment showed retardation. This retaruauion has been over-
come by improved management. The ^an*., a community in-
stitution, m nu^-indus trial city, is affiliated with a
national union headquarters more as a matter of investment,.
xhe Hammond bank has enjoyed success due greatly oo
a capable executive officer with a pronuuuccu »,oiit toward
cooperation. In 1929, it was the only institution which
continued to share profits with depositors. It has con-
tinued Its dual purpos es --carrying on a positive program of
trade union participation and education, and yet has main-
tained its independence and progress as a banking enter-
prise. Both the Chicago Amalgamated and the Newark banks
serve as added arguments to the permanence of labor banks.
No matter what failures of personnel policies or
purpose may be charged against the discontinued banks, the
labor bank movement is still continuing and is profiting by
the experience of the past. It may yet, after further
elimination of weaker banks, play a considerable part in
this country’s labor and financial activities.
?t
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In any treatment of banks which were discontinued on
account of failure, assessments, or liquidation, we must
note that the circumstances •which terminated seventeen of
these labor banks were so varied that it seems advisable to
group them according to causes which brought about termina-
tion.
Some banks failed or their assets or stock were sold
under circumstances which caused the original participants
to lose all or a major part of their investment. The
Producers’ and Consumers’ Bank of Philadelphia vhich was
exempt from state examination was an exemplification of
unsound banking. The group which sponsored it were wholly
self-interested, and displayed ignorance, inef f iciency
,
dishonesty, poor judgement, and favoritism. Loans for
speculation in real estate and small loa.ns to discredited
borrowers has been given as the immediate cause of failure.
The Mitten Interests of Philadelphia came to the front and
assumed the deposit liabilities of the bank, on condition
that individual depositors continued their accounts in a
successor Mitten Bank.
The Pittsburgh bank which failed in October 1920, did
not receive wide labor support due to trade union politics
and jealousies. The failure of this bank was due to ig-
norance, mis judgment^ incompetency
,
and self-interest. There
was but one savins rrac
e
in the management and history of this
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"bank. It was the misdirected faith and loyal support of
the president and of certain other officers and directors.
The Tuscon United Bank and Trust Company terminated,
June 1928. The bank v/as handicapped from the start by
bad management. Tenure of office vas insecure due to the
one share, one vote method of election and experienced
officers did not care to take chafge of the experiment.
The executive officer had full rein. Labor groups ex-
pected concessions, and the directors exercised little re-
straint
.
The Philadelphia Amalgamated bank vas liquidated, aiter
less than one year's existence, March 1926. The lesson
learned by the life of this bank was that there vas but
little likelihood of active ls/bor support for an institu-
tion sponsored by a national union which vas not strongly
represented in the © miranity.
Included in a third group of labor bank terminations
are tvo recent cases where banks came to an end because of
runs which arose from causes other than the financial con-
dition of the banks themselves. In Spokane, 1929, the two
Engineers' banks found themselves ca.ught in a banking crisis,
and subject to serious withdrawals. Disclosures concerning
the Engineers' financial ventures, made public 1927, were
still remembered. The banks were liquid and so were able
to withstand normal vithdravals. The Brotherhood Cooperative
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national Banlc was taken over Toy the largest bank of the
city and became the City National Bank. There were changes
in directorship and subsequent loss of Brotherhood loyalty.
The Brotherhood State Bank of Spokane, closely affiliated
with the Engineers’ Bank, soon felt the reflection of the
attitude of the depositors. This bank, which had never
been in thriving condition because of the competition of
two older and stronger institutions, affected a merger
with other banks.
A fourth group among the labor banks
,
include banks
whose stock was sold to non labor interests, eith in large
blocks by the trade unions or holding companies, or grad-
ually by the small stockholders. Three Engineers’ banks
were sold in 1926 and in 1927, prior to or during the
Brotherhood convention. The Brotherhood of Locomotive En-
gineers’ Cooperative Trust Company, opened in 1922, with a
capital of $750,000 was the first of the Engineers’ bank s
sold and was one of the Brotherhood’s worst exploits in
banking. During the last tvro ye; rs of its existence, the
bank accumulated over a million dollars’ worth of doubtful
paper. A flyer in Florida real estate, made to recoup
heavy losses took shape. Plans for a stupendous real estate
by
development, approved the Brotherhood, necessitated re-
trenchment elsewhere. A group of financiers purchased the
Brotherhood bank in 1926 and reorganized it under another
name
.
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The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Title and
Trust Company, Philadelphia, the second of the Engineers
hanks to he sold, accepted terms to merge, proposed hy
the Hit ten Bank of Philadelphia. The Brotherhood Bank
had a paying title and hond department, but labor support
was poor, due to the presence of the Mitten Bank in the
same city. The merger was achieved, -June 1927.
After the triennial convention of the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, June 6, 1927, there was a re-
duction in the confidence in the Engineers’ banks through-
out the country. The Cleveland bonk, which was hardest hit,
was affected by withdrawal of more than a quarter of its
deposits. "Only by the diversion of hundreds of thousands
of dollars into the banks from other sources, was the in-
stitution kept running." 1 Stone and his colleagues had
kept or attempted to keep the bubbles in mid-air, but the
reports of the Committee of ten, appointed to investigate
the Brotherhood’s financial affairs, pricked the bubbles and
disclosed "huge losses, errors of judgment, betrayals of
confidence, nepotism, inefficiency, and extravagance that
permeated the financial system which had so long camouflaged
itself as a great and glorious enterprise." 2
The result of even limited publicity had some effects on
other Engineers’ institutions. However, there were almost
immediately, considerable reductions in deposits. Luring the
1. The Labor Banking Movement in the United States
op. cit. p.
2. Ibid.
c*
*
*
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early stages of the od nvention, the Mitten interests of
Philadelphia offered to take over the financial crumbling
structure of the Engineers. The Brotherhood wls in dire
need of funds and its officers accepted the cash offer of
the Birmingham group to buy up control of the regional
holding company which controlled the Birminghtm bank. The
Mitten plan was condemned
Although the Engineers’ convention voted to withdrav;
from all financial enterprises, the liquidation of the
system was remarkably slow7
.
It was not until 1929, that the
sale of banks began again. There had been lack of positive
action for many months due to many causes. There was a
tremendous total of Brother commitments; the assets were to
a very greet extent non-liquid in character; management
furnished divided responsibility and no strong policy. The
loyalty of the members of the Brotherhood was appealed to,
in the hope that individuals would pay as heavy an assess-
ment as their loyalty would sustain. In addition further loans
were asked.
Three labor banks in the Pacific Southwest, whose
leaders had received advice for promotion as well as in-
spiration from the Cleveland Locomotive Engineers’ Eank, also
had unfortunate histories. These were the Los Angeles, the
Bakersfield, and the Ss,n Bernardino Banks. Local labor
politics undermined the Los Angeles bank; the Bakersfield
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bank was wrongly promoted; the San Bernardino, had but
indifferent success, suffered from the declaration of
eighteen and a half per cent dividends and a fifteen per
cent stock dividend within less than two years after open-
ing the bank.
In Hew York, the bank founded by the International
Ladies’ Garment ^orkers in 1924, passed-out of labor control
in 1927. The bank had been forced to lend the union and
its subdivisions a sum of money which tote lied $369,000
more than four»fifths of the bank’s capital amount. Be-
cause of internal dissensions and heavy drains during
strikes, the union was unable to return the loan. The state
bonking department was brought into the situation. The union
was forced to give up its equity in the bank stock to secure
funas to repay the loan. By the end of 1927, the union lost
control of the bank.
The Houston, Texas Bank ended a career of indifferent
success in September, 1928; during the three years of its
existence, it paid no dividends. This bonk was handicapped
from the start, for labor support was poor; good commercial
accounts were secured with difficulty; confidence in the
bank was lessened by unfortunate c ircums t- nces preceeding its
promotion, its small size, and lack of sufficient connections
with the business and booking interests of the city.
The San Francisco Bank, existing in a financial center
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rather than in a pay-roll city had few contacts upon which
it could rely for developing types of "business necessary
for heel thy growth* Excessive overhead ate into surplus.
Untoward publicity, dissension, frozen and the
suspicion of other banks proved to have the effect of a
near paralysis. In February, 1329, the Calitalo In-
vestment Corporation working through the Hellenci American
Company, with which it was merged, purchased for seventy-
five dolla rs a share the controlling block of stock, which
had cost the Brotherhood one hundred thirty dollars a
share. Many small savers, railroad men, laborers, mechanics,
and housewives had been credulous victims of the Engineers’
stock salesmen on the West Coast.
The deposits of the Seattle Banks had greatly de-
clined since the Engineers’ troubles became known in 192V.
Seattle was an unfortunate choice of location.
With such great changes on the West Coast, the ex-
tensive banking system of the Engineers was reduced to a
few scattered banks. The Nottingham bank, which had grown
considerably since its inception in 1922, had paid no
dividends
. It wras tree ted as a suburban branch of the
Cleveland institution. Later the Nottingham Bank was sold
to local interests.
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In 1929, in addition to the Portland and Tacoma
banks, only the Boston and Minneapolis banks, outside of
Cleveland, remained under Brotherhood control. Even
then, the negotiations for transfer of the Boston bank
were in progress. ITo dividends had been paid on this
bank, and deposits, July 1929 were but little more than
five times the bank’s capitalization. Negotiations for
the sale of the Minneapolis bank ve e initiated in 1928.
Few of these banks noted in this fourth group--the
banks sold to non-labor interests, prospered under labor
control. "There is much reason to believe that the de-
gree of success attained varied universal./ to the extent
of labor directors and officers filled positions which
should have been occupied by business men and trained
bankers," according to an authentic study. Inability to
secure business, frozen loans to friendly interests, and
general instability, and indifferent combinations were
the most apparent handicaps which these banks acquired
through the influence of labor groups or labor organizations
upon their financial policies.
The research department of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of Amexica compiled the data shoving the condition
of the various labor uanxs on Dec. 31st, 1925. The total
resources of 36 banks were ffllb . b29 . 058 . which represented
l
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a grov/th of approximately 15 per cent during a six months’
period.
Perhaps no better picture could be shown of the
changes which have occurred in the number and in the re-
sources of labor banks, than to compare the above in-
formation, which telis the story of labor banks when
the movement was at its height, with trie condition of
labor banks, as give Novemoer x931, which is the latest
available information as seo xorwh in: the Monthly Labor
Review.
On June 30, 193x, thuA- were in existence 11 banks
operating under lauwr-uxiion auspices. These banks had
total resources amounting to $59,401,164. During the
fiscal, ye. ± 1930-31, two banks closed, one went out of
business, «na oxxe furnished no report. 1
'•The labor oaring movement reached its height in
the first quax. a el 1927, when there were apparently
thirty-iivc xaocr banks, with a combined capital of
*>9, a 00 , 000, surplus and undivided profits oi , ;.4 ,±b;d , 000,
deposits of $109,785,000, ana wooal resources of
$128,141,000. Since then some few new; banks have been
started, but by July 1929, the total number of banks in
operation had shrunk to twenty-four
;
their capital to
$7,012,000; their surplus and undivided g^ofits to
$3,823,000; deposits to $93,950,000; and resources to
$110.538.000."
1. Condition of Labor Banks, June, 1931
Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 33, No. 5 (Nov., 1931)
p. 100.
l t •<
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'•In both number and resources, the movement is
smaller today than it was several years ago ; the period
of contagious growth appears, for the movement, at least,
to be past. A substantial number of institutions have
been sold or liquidated bee; use of mismanagement and of
those that are left, a very few can lay just cla,im to
features that distinguish them from the common run of
small, privately owned and operated commercial banks." 1
Analysis of the Labor Banking Standpoint
Labor Standpoint
In any appraisal of the success of the Labor
Ba.nking Movement from the labor standpoint we must take
into consideration what motives led to the inception of
the movement. Since the motives and purpose^ under-
lying the labor banking movement have been classified
into five groups, the contributions of the movement can
be studied with these motives in viev.
,
if it is true that
such motives did concern the interests and prestige of the
labor movement. These motives have been so classified:
business, protective, aggressive, cooperative, psychological.
Consideration of the business motive, the Princeton
Survey shows, is bound to lead to the conclusion that
probably little, if any, net return could be shown as a
contribution to the labor movement from a business returns
:oint of viev. if financial profits < nd losses accruing to
1. TTolman, Leo. op. cit. p. 11.
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labor organizations and their members could be computed.
A dozen or more banks did earn dividends. Some banks
paid no dividends, v:hich reduced the average dividends
paid by all banks. There have been less than a dozen
labor institutions Thick have been sufficiently success-
ful to warrant the argument that motives other than
financial returns justify trade union investment banks
stocks. Only in four of five labor banks have the
returns exceeded that which could be easily obtained on
high-grade bonds real-estate mortgages, or similar safe
investments. "In only the most successful institutions
can further use of trade union funds be warranted." 1
"Some advantage had accrued to certain national
unions through the financial advice obtained from- the
officers of the headquarters bank." 2 However, this
advice has been no better than that available at any high
grade institution which the union could use.
The Y.ei kness has been employment of officers, in-
capable of advising union treasurers, and the liability of
depending upon a single bank officer for the determination
of the bank’s and the union’s investments. The best
method would have been to have empoyed available services
of the best investment counsel available. "Safety of
principle and the assurance of good yield are more important
to the trade union movement, than the doubtful sr.tisfaction
of self-sufficiency," is the opinion of the Princeton Survey.
1. The Labor Banking Movement in the U. S. op. cit.
p. 265.
2. Ibid. p. 265.
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The second motive, the protective motive, which has
often been claimed by labor as one of the very strongest
purposes behind the lubor banking movement, is frankly
treated in a study made by the Industrial Relations Section
of Princeton University. "The American labor movement has
probably been injured far more through the various failures
in labor banking than through all the machinations of
Lnti -union bankers." Surely this is a serious indictment.
The decreasing number of labor banks and the few
cities in which such banks existed have had their influ-
ence restricted. In the early days
,
the vide publicity
labor banks received, afforded them power to suggest to
old-line bankers the possibilities of counter attack should
these bankers use open tactics against organized labor.
The labor banking movement has exposed "Labor" to
the assaults of "Capital", just as well as it has protected
it. Proof of this is shown in the injury done the En-
gineers through Stone and his successors who did more to
injure the labor movement than any other trade union has
ever done; in particular, through the fight with the United
Mine Workers over the Coal River Colleries and by impair-
ing the © nfidence of the rank and file in the sincerity
of the trade union leaders especially just prior to the
convention of 1927, when officers of the Brotherhood went
so far as to aaree to a -policy of dealing with the
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railroads which would "be contrary to the tenets of the
workers affected "by this policy.
The third motive, or aggressive purpose, which
refers to the advancement of labor’s interests through
labor banking' is treated with equal frankness
:
"Labor banking w as aimed to advance the cause of
laboras well as to protect it. By means of loans to
fair employers or investments in their securities, union
recognition and collective bargaining were to be promoted.
The occasions upon which this has taken place in the many
years of labor banking have been almost negligible. 1
The New York Amalgamated Bank alone has more than
one or two instances to record. Opportunities even here,
have been few
.
Judged by its accomplishments in this
line, labor banking has little of serious measure to
contribute. Labor would have profited far more had the
bad loans made by unsuccessful banks been sfved to
labor
.
As to the hope often expressed, that labor banks
may indulge in strategic lending, this has rarely been
realized.
"More candid and experienced labor officials have
long since accepted the fact that this purpose of labor
banking was good publicity rather than vise policy to be
fulfilled by the strongest banks alone, under the most
propitious and unusual circumstances," 2
A third motive, often referred to as one which had
for its purpose tn^ ^r^motion of cooperation, does receive
comment which admits of success
.
1, The Labor Banking Movement in the U. S. op. cit.
2. Ibid. p. 269.
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X
X
X
*
,
73.
As an adjunct of the labor movement, labor banks
have advanced the cooperative movement. The Amalgamated
institutions have helped to finance cooperatives. The
strength of the enterprises of these institutions have
helped to finance the union administration and the
solidarity of the rank and file. However, though banks
at Chicago, Gary, Indianapolis, Patterson, Washington,
loaned workers on first mortgages and the Amalgamated
Bank of Hew York played an important part in the
financing of the Amalgamated Cooperative Apartments
in Hew York, the greatest aid has been in ’’aiding that
class -conscious
,
mutual helpfulness which might serve
more than any other influence to make the American
labor movement comparable to that of Great Britain." 1.
The psychological motive in the formation of
labor banks seems to have been a factor in the desire to
secure prestige. The publicity given the marked success
of a few labor banks cannot affect the disclosures of
inefficiency and failure which have taken place.
Authorities feel that the prestige of the Pederation or
of its constituent unions have not been advanced by labor
banking. Whatever success has been earned by successful
banks, the prestige has accrued to the labor representa-
tives who as individuals have successfully engaged in
banking.
As in an.\ popular movement, politics was present
1. The Labor Banking Movement in the U. S. on. cit.
p. 270
A-
I
\
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As in a.ny popular movement, politics was present
and active in labor banking forces. The labor banking
movement developed with a background of union politics.
Especially was this true of the Engineers’ financial
s ys t em .
Two groups of labor banks sponsored by strong
national unions, where the officers’ ability gained them
respect so great and afforded them a position so strongly
entrenched, that political strategy has been inactive in
\
the union and consequently less active in the bank. The
second group includes banks sponsored by many local
unions or labor graupg
,
where the bank has been kept on
the side lines in any union fight, either because a large
number of banks were interested or because the activities
of the bank were rela lively unimportant.
un
'•The diversions of labor’s funds into successful
labor banks while serious, will soon be repaired, except
where pension and insurance departments have suffered. The
relative prosperity of American Labor has given it far too
much reserve for te losses to affect the movement more than
slightly. The losses of individual members and of outside
investors are more sdrious, but these seem quietly for-
gotten, except by the losers themselves." 1
As late as May 1930, Leo Wolman of the National
Bureau of Economic Research of New York, summarized the
causes for the excesses of the enterprises of labor as
evidenced by the ambitious excursion of the labor move-
ment into the field of business for profit. First,
feels that such excesses were due to the accident of the
1. The Labor Banking Movement in the U. S. op, cit.
p. 274
.
\1 K
.
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period. They- were planned during the boom years of the
war and carried on in the post-war period of prosperity
and speculative enthusiasm. Their originators foiled to
appreciate the necessity for sound and deliberate growth.
In its early history, the Engineers’ Bank of Cleveland made
large profits from its holdings of United States Government
securities. These profits ’’contributed to an exaggerated
and fallacious notion of the normal sources and levels of
banking profits.” 1
Secondly, and more important, Wolman says there are
factors inherent in the nature and traditional practices
of trade unionism which force it to remain largely
legislative and not administrative. What such trade unions
need are skillful, elastic administrative practices de-
signed to fit the pecularities of each new situation.
Such practices he believes, were missing from the majority
of labor organizations.
Thirdly, the bulk of labor Officials have an executive
experience that is narrov and monotonous. Organizers spend
much of their time adjusting piece, rates or petty grievances
when major problems should be their objectives. "Wolman
believes that the trade union should undertake for its ov.n
interests a study of the problems of its industry and an
assuming of an increased share of its responsibility for
its own policies and for those of industry. Unions which
do this will -produce offi cers who are alert, thoughtful, and
1. Y/olman, Leo. Labor Banks. Quarterly Journal of
Economics. ALIY (Kay, 1930$
,
p. 545.
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alive to problems, which undoubtedly will mean something more
then growth in membership.
Both in state of mind and in experience of its
leaders the labor union has not been equipped to manage
undertakings which require in their executive personnel,
the qualities of skill, experience, and elasticity of mind*
"Experience in the few cases of successful Business
enterprise by organized labor already shows how progressive
unionism has created the type of official which traditional
unionism so sadlj iacKs
;
and how, again, exposure of such
men to the fresh experiences of Dan*.mg and business has
contributed to sharpen their wits and to enhance &neir
usefulness to the labor movement." 1.
Warden Stone, head of the Brother and moving spirit
behind these nev policies of his union, died in 1927. At
the special convention of ohe Brotherhood convened in
Cleveland in 1927 to consider the financial condition of its
subsidiary institutions ana of the union itself, reports
submitted disclosed nix uhe usual consequences of incompetent
inexperienced management and of unsound financial pyramiding.
The onv, «anks contained excessive amounts oi
irozen assets of of bad commercial paper; shifting of
jLiaDiiities from one institution to another spreta xuin
conong all, and resulted from interlocking ownersnxp ana
management. Many undertakings were a nut down through lack
of nev; funds.
The Convention of 1927 ordered radical changes in
management; established a new financial administration
within the union: author ized the liquidation and sale of
1. Wolman, Leo. Labor Banks. Quarterly Journal of
Economics. XL IV (May 1950), p. 545.

many of its properties
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Banks and other enterprises
v:ere liquidated and sold, though the whole process of
liquidation v- as not ended, May 1930.
As late as August 21, 1929, the New Republic noted
that the labor banks, l^ke the labor movement, itself,
had already had its conspicuous successes as well as its
deplorable failures.
"A few institutions under labor ownership control now
have resources of between $10,00,000 and $20,000,000 each,
and at their present rate of growth are likely within a
decade to be regarded as substantial financial enterpris es
,
even in a banking center like New York." 1.
Under such adverse general conditions as nov; exist
in business and banking, it hardly seems possible that
Mr. holme.n’s hopes will ^e realized.
A current periodical, in discussing the two views as
to the tendency and influence of labor banking, noted that
the sponsors of labor banks believed that the movement meant
the gradual control by labor of capital, and the view of
critics that the movement meant the eventual submersion of the
interests and ideals of the workers in those of business.
The editor thought all such news far fetched. Said he,
"Labor banks will at the most be only a factor and
possibly merely an incident in the course of banking.
Allowing for inefficiency and actual graft--there will bd
instances of both all too soon in labor banking--is there
any reason to suppose tho,t labor’s money cannot be more
effectively handled by its friends than by those, who in
general, are only its exploiters?" 2
An extensive review of Fectue.ry 5, 1930, tells us
that lose than ten ye- rs after 7/arren Stone founded the
1. Wolman
,
Leo. Labor banking after Ten Years. LX.
(Aug. 21, 1929), p. 12.
2. Labor and Its Money. The Nation. XVII (Nov. 1925)
p. 545.
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Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers National Bank and
started the Brotherhood on its disastrous financial career,
’’the engineers will he out of the hanking business in
Cleveland.” 1 The Clevel nd Bank and Trust Company
had heen formed to buy and consolidate the Engineers’
Bank, a separate savings end loan company and a suburban
bank, which the Engineers’ Brotherhood had controlled for
a time.
In comparison with the successes and failures already
discussed, a reminder of the activities controlled by
the Brotherhood in 1925 are here submitted:
"Cleveland Bank, resources
Brotherhood Holding Co., incorporated for,
Brotherhood Investment Co., capital paid in
Brotherhood Headquarters Building, which cost
Brotherhood Branch Bank Building, which cost
Brotherhood Bank Building
,
then under construction,
Banks in Minneapolis:
Spokane, Oregon
S eattle
Tacoma
Hillyard, Y/ashington
Birmingham, Alabama
Hammona, Indiana
S an Franc is c o
1. Locomotive Engineers Sell Cleveland Bank.
Business Y'eekly. (Peb. 5>, 1930
)
, p. 10
$27,824,000
1
,
000,000
10
,
000,000
1
,
200,000
1.400.000
6.600.000
<*
< * <
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Philadelphia
Bos ton
ITew York." 1
Contrast this report with the following one showing the
present holdings (1930). 2
A minority stock interest in the Empire Trust Co., IT. Y.
The Equitable Building, IT. Y.
which cost the Brotherhood £38* 000, 000
Pour regional securities end investment companies
Coal River Colleries
,
West Virginia
a coal mining property 2,800,000
Ownership by individual members of the Brotherhood
The Hobart Stone Co.
a mail order house of Cleveland 250,000
Park Lane Villa
an apartment hotel of Cleveland 2,600,000
several smaller enterprises.
The Brotherhood attracted considerable attention to
itsfclf through its activity in land in Plorida. Here, it
purchased 27,000 acres of land near Sarasota with the original
purpose of making a quick turn. At the collapse of the Florida
land boom, the Brotherhood decided to develop the property.
Money reported to have been put into Florida land, totalled
$14,524,000, according to the report rendered at the 1927
convention. This a mount v
:
furnished by the Brotherhood,
1. Locomotive Engineers Sell Cleveland Bank. Business
Weekly. (Feb. 5, 1930), p. 10
2. Ibid, p. 11.
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its controlled Brotherhood Investment Company, the sale
of "bonds and the sale of lots. The Investment Company’s
last statement carried it Florida properties, receivable
at $7,190,273.
From 1927 to 1930, much of the Brotherhood property
has been disposed of. The Branch Bank Building in
Cleveland was sold at a lost of £'250,000. The Equitable
Building was sold at a profit of about $900, 000. The
Empire Trust Stock was sold at a profit of about $ 600, 000,
Banks sold to the Mittens and to local capital have already
been cited.
After the coal mining property’s reactions with John
L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers and its other diffi-
c cities, it went into receivership. It is now being
oper ted by the North American Coal Corporation, the
Tapi in Company, which assumes the $5000,000 bonds.
The Brotherhood is still (1930 ) holding the Florida,
property, and has considered a number of propositions for
its disposal. Recently, "The Engineers’ Journal" has
suggested that the Cleveland headquarters of the Brother-
hood be moved to this real estate development.
January 22, 1930 the E. H. Price Company bought
suit against the Brotherhood for an amount named as
$900,000. The basis for this was th& t the Company located
in Sarasota, Florida claimed a 5/Z commission on the Venice
development which the Brotherhood sponsored.
<
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In the fall of 1927, Claudius H. Huston, then president of
a
the Brotherhood Mangement Corporation, undertook the re-
organization of the Brotherhood T s enterprises, particularly
the Florida real estate. However, internal dissensions in
the Brotherhood presented the corporation from carrying out
an agreement with John McEntee , Bowman for the operation
of the real estate. The plan was dropped.
ITo new financial ventures have been undertaken by
the Brotherhood since 1927. 'The membership 1ms been paying
assessments to guarantee certain assets of the investment
company &nd to make good other losses.
Summary
This study has sought to trace the evolution of the
labor banking movement which started with the opening of
the lit. Vernon Savings Bank in 1920, end which was quickly
followed by the launching of the Commercial Bank of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. From this small be-
ginning in 1922 there was a rapid and constant growth in
the number of labor banks until there were 25 banks in ex-
istence in 1924. By 1926, the increase was so rapid that
56 banks were in existence. This number remained nearly
constand until 1927, when the peak was reached. Beeline in
numbers was gradual until 1928, where there was a very
decided decrese in the number of existing banks until the
last half of 1929 when the re were 22 banks in existence.
1. Monthly Labor Review'. (E'ov., 1931), p. 100.
t
The latest official report of labor banks in the United
States gives a report of 11 banks.
Apart from tracing the evolution of labor banks this
study has dealt with the purposes of labor banking. These
purposes have sometimes been placed under t\ o broad heo-ds :
l) to serve the wage earner; this led to the development
of the small unsecured or character loan; £) to advance the
trade union movement; this led to favor fair employers
in loans and investments. It must be agreed that labor
banks did fulfill these two purposes.
The cases for the start of labor banks has been
credited to: l) the accumulated resources of some unions
which made it easy for them to engage in business enter-
prises; 2) the purchasing power of the members of the
unions, by which they were able to save and invest greater
sums of money than laboring men ever saved or invested
before; 3) the need for safe investments for v orkers
’
earnings; 4) the desire for power as evidenced by the ac-
tivities of men like Warren Stone; 5) a psychological cause
based on the past experience that in financial enterprises
the employer was supposed to reign supreme. Several of these
five causes grew out cf the two purposes mentioned previously.
The chief asset of these banks was good will. Many
of them went farther than other banking ins i tut ions in ad-
vising customers as to business and legal matters of a
routine nature. The service they rendered to individuals
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of limited, means and experience was a “big factor in
developing good will. One very important service they
rendered was in handling foreign remittances.
It mus u be remembered that the two unions which
were most active in these financial enterprises were out-
side the Federation of Labor. Samuel Gompers did not
hesitate to voice his opinions as to the possibilities and
tne limitations of labor banks. Speaking through the
official organ of the Federation, he remarked that labor
oanks could not make strikes impossible; all they could do
was to eliminate some of the more outstanding events of
the banking business. 1
If we examine the statement of the successes of the
labor banking movement from a banking standpoint as given in
a previous section of this paper we shall be disheartened
indeed. If ve examine the importance of Mr. Gomper’s state-
ment that all labor banks could do was to eliminate outstand-
ing events of the banking business, we have something of
great significance.
It is a very easy matter to say of a movement like
that of labor banks which had a spectacular appeal and a
rapid constant rise, which was followed by a more spectacular
declind and a more rapid collapse--it is extremely easy to
say that la.bor banks from any standpoint have been a. failure.
Perhaps we have trained ours elves to decide that anything that
1. Gompers, Samuel, Labor Banks C. K. but Fo Solution.
American Federationis ts
.
(March, 1S23) p. 252-254

does not endure is not successful. Should we not how-
ever, make our decisions on the basis of ho?' ? rell these
banks served the causes and achieved the desired ob-
jectives of the period that gave them birth?
It is true that these banks suffered from inept
administration and union politics, but there were many
banks which had careful administrators, conservative
policies tend whose motives v/ere entirely humanitarian.
it does seem that labor banks did serve a very great
service by forcing the old time banking institutions to
change their conservative methods. Te can not say that
because great financial losses were sustained by the labor
banks that they were entirely unsuccessful. Because banks
other than labor banks have failures, we do not condemn the
entire banking system. Similar reasoning should apply to
labor banks
.
As to the outlook for the future, the present business
condition of the nation is entirely unfavorable to any ex-
pectation of growth of labor banks. Added to t.is condition,
the unfortunate nappenings of labor banks, have been recent
and will not soon oe iorgotten. Then too, three labor baulks
have passed out of existence during the fiscal year, and no
new labor banks have been initiated.
The following statement from the. Princeton Survey
reives the uest r m .rais 1 of labor banks :

o5
The accomplishments of the successful labor banks
have warranted the keen interest and enthusiasm they have
aroused. As a permanent residual, their continued grov/th
will peimi o iurther contributions to democratic banking, --
witnout che most painstaking examination of the experiences
of the past, a reviva.1 of the movement of the post-wax
^eoxo v. ouxu uc uufn dangerous ana inexcusable."
.,
.
.
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